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Administrative Law-American Textile Manufacturers Institute,
Inc. v. Donovan: Judicial Review Under OSHA
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of. 1970' set the ambitious goal
of assuring "so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions."'2 In both its language and its tone, the
Act emphasized worker health and safety, which were to be promoted through
the promulgation of national standards. The Secretary of Labor was directed
in compelling but unfortunately imprecise terms to set standards that "to the
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence," would prevent
material impairment of employee health.3 In American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc. v. Donovan4 the United States Supreme Court considered basic
definitional parameters for the type of evidence that would be deemed suffi-
cient to withstand the "substantial evidence" standard of judicial review man-
dated by the Act.5 In American Textile representatives of the cotton industry,
insisting that both highly exacting evidence6 and cost-benefit analysis7 were
required under the Act, brought suit challenging the validity of the cotton dust
standards set by the Secretary.8 Giving a deferential reading to "substantial
evidence," the Court ruled that feasibility analysis was sufficient for the enact-
ment of standards9 to combat cotton dust exposure and the resulting brown
lung disease, regardless of the cost to the industry. 10 The Court thereby recog-
nized the Secretary's broad power to regulate, even in cases in which data
imperfection inevitably yielded evidence of debatable substance. The concern
for the textile worker's health preempted the rigorous substantial evidence re-
quirement and cost-benefit analysis urged by the industry.
The cotton dust exposure standards under attack in American Textile
were those issued by the Secretary of Labor in June 1978."1 Temporary stan-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
2. Id. § 651(b).
3. Id. § 655(b)(5). The text of the section provides as follows:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately as-
sures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.. . . In addition to the
attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other
considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the
standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws. Whenever
practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria
and of the performance desired.
4. 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976) provides that "[tihe determinations of the Secretary shall be
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole."
6. 101 S. Ct. at 2497.
7. Id. at 2483.
8. Id. The standards are codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1981).
9. Id. at 2492.
10. Id. at 2504.
11. Codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1981). See generally 101 S. Ct. at 2485-87 (providing
a more in-depth treatment of the history of cotton dust standards in the United States).
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dards had been promulgated in 1970,12 but debate over allowable exposure
standards continued through the next decade. In 1978, acting through the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Secretary promul-
gated permanent standards that reflected a predominant concern for worker
health. 13 However, it had become apparent long before 1978 that worker
health in the textile industry was a matter of great national concern. By the
1960s, exposure to cotton dust had been shown unequivocally to bear a direct
relation to the incidence of brown lung disease, or byssinosis, a serious respira-
tory disease that affects more than 100,000 workers in the textile industry.' 4
Incidence rates range from twenty to thirty percent among workers exposed to
the dust, and "each worker faces a substantial risk of health impairment."' 5
The variable 200/500/750 micrograms per cubic meter (Rig/m 3) standard
that ultimately was adopted was predicated on the results of two separate ex-
posure studies. 16 Research Triangle Institute (RTI), an OSHA-contracted
group, conducted the first study. The second study was the result of an in-
dependent investigation conducted by industry representatives (Hocutt-
Thomas). 17 Both studies focused in part on the total cost of engineering con-
12. See 101 S. Ct. at 2485 (pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976)).
13. In 1966 the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) had
recommended that cotton dust exposure be limited to 1000 micrograms per cubic meter of air
(1000 jig/m 3) per eight-hour workday. Id. at 2485. The temporary regulation promulgated in
1970 included the 1000 pjg/m 3 limit for total dust exposure. See note 12 supra. In 1974 ACGIH
lowered its recommended daily exposure levels to 200 pjg/m 3, at which time the Director of the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (created by the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1976))
requested that the Secretary adopt the more stringent standard. 101 S. Ct. at 2485. By that time,
the Textile Workers Union of American had joined with the North Carolina Public Interest Re-
search Group to petition the Secretary to set an exposure limit of 100 tjg/m 3. Id. After three
hearings, much testimony, and numerous post-hearing comments and briefs, the following final
cotton dust standards were adopted:
Mandatory Permissible Exposure Limit
Over Eight-Hour Period
Yarn manufacturing ................................................. 2001ig/m 3
Slashing and weaving operations ...................................... 750jig/m 3
All other operations ................................................. 5001gg/m 3
101 S. Ct. at 2486-87.
14. See S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5177, 5179 (noting that recognition of brown lung disease as a distinct occupational hazard
was relatively recent in the United States despite repeated warnings from other textile-producing
nations). For an overview of brown lung disease in the textile industry, see Brown Lung: Hearing
Before a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1978); Schrag &
Gullett, Byssinosis in Cotton Textile Mills, 101 Am. Rev. Resp. Disease 497 (1970).
15. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1979), afld in part, vacated in part
sub nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981). SinceAmerican
Textile was decided in June 1981, the American Textile Manufacturers Institute has conducted its
own study, which reports that fewer than one-half of one percent of textile workers suffer from
byssinosis. Telephone interview with Elisa Braver, Epidemiologist, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 1,
1982). However, Braver cited a number of critical inadequacies with the Institute's methodology:the study lacked a control group, failed to use the conventional Schilling classification to diagnose
health impairment and gave only marginal attention to exposure data. Thus, there is serious doubtas to the reliability of the Institute's conclusion tha  only 670 of the 400,000 workers surveyed
suffered from byssinosis. Id.16. 101 5. Ct. at 2497. See also note 13 supra.
17. Id. at 2497. See RTI, Cotton Dust: Technological Feasibility Assessment and Final In-
flationary Impact Statement (1976); see also Statements of Hovan Hocutt, Senior Vice-President,
Engineering, Pneumafil Corp., Ex. 60, 2228-47 and Arthur Thomas, Senior Vice-President, The
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trols for the achievement of more stringent exposure levels than the temporary
1000 pjg/m 3 limit.18 The common focus did not lead to a common result,
however. RTI estimated that compliance with proposed standards would cost
the textile industry $1.1 billion, while Hocutt-Thomas indicated that similarly
protective exposure levels could be achieved through engineering controls
costing only $543 million. 19
In the course of setting its standards, OSHA questioned the validity of
both studies. RTI mistakenly had included in its computations both synthetic
mills, whose operations do not generate cotton dust, and mills already in com-
pliance. In addition, the RTI study lacked current data.20 Hocutt-Thomas
also was thought improperly to have included synthetic mills in its compliance
calculations. Moreover, Hocutt-Thomas failed to take into account natural
production trends to replace old machinery and technological advances likely
to occur during the four-year compliance period.2 1 In spite of these acknowl-
edged data inadequacies, OSHA finally adopted the Hocutt-Thomas study as
"more realistic" than that of RTI.22
Claiming that $543 million was a gross underestimate for compliance
given the stringent standards finally adopted,23 the industry brought suit chal-
lenging the standard in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.24 The court of appeals held that there was substantial evidence to
support the standard and that feasibility analysis was contemplated by the
Act. 25 Twelve individual cotton textile manufacturers and the American Tex-
tile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., which represents more than 175 companies,
then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review. Petitioners chal-
lenged the substantiality of the evidence supporting OSHA's determination
that the cotton dust standard was economically feasible26 and alleged that the
Bahnson Co., Ex. 62, 2248-57, reprinted in joint appendix to AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636
(D.C. Cir. 1979). Because the Hocutt-Thomas study was the more recent of the two, it was perhaps
more attractive to OSHA in its search for valid data.
18. See note 13 supra.
19. 101 S. Ct. at 2498. RTI had made cost estimates for permissible exposure limits (PELs)
of 100, 200 and 500 t~g/m 3, but OSHA found them too unreliable to adopt as final estimates. Id.
at 2500 n.53. Hocutt insisted that a PEL of 200 iig/m 3 was technologically impracticable for
certain production operations; therefore, he declined to prepare cost estimates for the 200 Pjg/m 3
level. Id.
20. Id. at 2498.
21. Id. at 2499.
22. Id. at 2498.
23. The guidelines ultimately promulgated not only set the variable exposure level of
200/500/750 jig/m 3, but also called for exposure monitoring, medical surveillance of employees,
educational programs, provision of respirators in certain situations and transfer without loss of
pay for any employee unable to wear a required respirator. Id. at 2487.
24. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), afid in part, vacated in part sub
nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
25. Id. at 664-66. See note 3 supra & note 31 infra. The court expressed humanitarian con-
cerns in rejecting cost-benefit analysis under 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976): "Especially where a
pliy aims to protect the health and lives of thousands of people, the difference in comparing
widely dispersed benefits with more concentrated and calculable costs may overwhelm the advan-
tages of such analysis." 617 F.2d at 655. These same concerns also offer a partial explanation for
the court's very flexible application of the "substantial evidence" standard of review.
26. 101 S. Ct. at 2483 & n.5, 2497.
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Act required the Secretary to engage in a cost-benefit analysis before promul-
gating any exposure standard.27 Additionally, petitioners questioned the au-
thority of OSHA to mandate a transfer with full pay for industry employees
unable to wear required respirators.28 The industry received a single, cold
concession in the Court's ruling-the issue of transfer with pay was remanded
for determination whether the provision bore a reasonable relationship to the
protection of worker health.29 The ruling of the court of appeals was upheld
in all other respects.30 Not only was an elaborate cost-benefit analysis rejected
in favor of a simple feasibility analysis, 3 1 but also the admittedly imprecise
Hocutt-Thomas study was found to present evidence of sufficient substantial-
ity to warrant upholding the standards adopted by the Secretary.32
Although the decision was a difficult one for the industry to accept, it was
well in keeping with the legislative history of the Act. The legislative intent
behind the Act admittedly was "not crystal clear,"'33 but congressional debate
was unmistakably "replete with concern about dangers" to worker health and
safety.34 In American Textile rejection of the substantial evidence challenge
27. Id. at 2483.
28. Id. at 2483 & n.5, 2504.
29. Id. at 2505-06.
30. Id. at 2506.
31. Id. at 2491-97. Cost-benefit analysis would consist of balancing costs to the industry
against the resulting reduction in risk to the working population. Such an analysis certainly
would require some calculation of the value of human life. By contrast, feasibility analysis re-
quires that a regulatory agency address these three questions: (1) does the worksite present unsafe
conditions of employment or significant risks to worker health?; (2) is the standard promulgated
the most protective possible?; and (3) is achievement of the standard feasible? See generally Note,
Section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Health Act of 1970: Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Required?, 49
Fordham L. Rev. 432 (1980).
32. 101 S. Ct. at 2500. The evidence ultimately was found to support a total cost estimate for
compliance which included engineering controls at $543 million (Hocutt-Thomas study), medical
surveillance and monitoring at $7 million, and waste and seed processing at $106.5 million, for a
total of $656.5 million. Id. at 2498 n.44.
In deciding whether OSHA's determination had been based on "substantial evidence," the
Court followed the standard of review articulated in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951). See 101 S. Ct. at 2497. In that case, the Court stated that "substantial evidence" is
"more than a mere scintilla. . . . [It is] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." 340 U.S. at 477. While the reviewing court must take con-
tradictory evidence into account, the "possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial
evidence." Consolo v. Federal Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). Ordinarily, an "arbitrary
and capricious" standard of judicial review is used in cases involving informal rulemaking proce-
dures. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). However, the Administrative
Procedure Act applies only when the statute in question does not provide specifically for a stan-
dard of review. Id. § 703. In the case of OSHA, the "substantial evidence" standard is mandated
by 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). Thus, by combining the informal procedure of notice-and-comment
rulemaking with the essentially formal standard of "substantial evidence" review, OSHA has a
"hybrid nature." Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,473 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Review
is therefore complicated for the court, since detailed records often are lacking because of the
informal procedures. For an insightful treatment of "substantial evidence" review in this area, see
Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1233(1951); Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 Va. L. Rev. 185 (1974); Note, Scru-
tiny of OSHA Regulation in the Courts: A Study of Judicial Activism, 14 U. Rich. L. Rev. 623
(1980).
33. 101 S. Ct. at 2493.
34. Note, supra note 31, at 445 (indicating that employee safety is paramount concern of the
Act, as reflected in legislative history). As introduced by Representative Daniels in the House,
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and the cost-benefit analysis represented a recognition by the Court that math-
ematical exactitude cannot be demanded when considering worker health in
the light of state-of-the-art technology and present medical knowledge.
The Court had been offered an earlier opportunity in Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute35 to clarify the issues of substan-
tial evidence review and cost-benefit analysis in a case involving the benzene
exposure standard. The issue of substantial evidence emerged as the touch-
stone of the Court's holding in American Petroleum. The cost-benefit issue
never was reached, since the stringent benzene standards were held unenforce-
able because they were unsupported by evidence of sufficient scientific sub-
stantiality.36 The threshold proof that a low exposure level was "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" to effect a drop in the incidence of leukemia simply
had not been produced. 37 On the basis of more than fifty volumes of exhibits
and testimony, OSHA had found that a reduction in exposure from ten parts
to one part per million of benzene was "likely" to yield "appreciable" bene-
fits.3 8 The Court, emphasizing that administrative procedure placed the bur-
den upon the agency to justify any new standard promulgated, did not think
that the evidence met the substantiality requirement. 39 The Court did recog-
nize that "OSHA is not required to support its finding that a significant risk
exists with anything approaching scientific certainty." 4 In particular, the
Court thought that section 655(b)(5), which specifically allows the Secretary to
promulgate regulations on the basis of the "best available evidence, ' '41 "gave
OSHA some leeway where its findings must be made on the frontiers of scien-
tific knowledge." 42 Nevertheless, the plurality remained unconvinced by the
fifty volumes of benzene data and refused to approve the more protective
standard.
The dissent in American Petroleum espoused a more liberal notion of
"leeway" and expressed the strongly worded view that the Secretary clearly
had produced "substantial evidence that exposure to benzene caused leuke-
mia."' 4 3 While the dissenters plainly recognized that it was their duty to un-
OSHA originally required a standard that "most adequately assures... that no employee will
suffer any impairment of health." H.R. Rep. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970). Emphasizing
that the House bill reflected an unfairly "single-minded punitive approach" towards employers,
Senator Dominick led a drive that culminated in several restrictive amendments. Sen. Rep. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1970). As finally codified, the Act was limited to concerns of "mate-
rial health impairment" caused by "toxic materials or harmful physical agents." 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(5) (1976). The scope of the Act was narrowed, but its preeminent concern was still
worker health. See 101 S. Ct. at 2493-97.
35. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 653.
37. Id. at 638.
38. Id. at 653.
39. Id. at 652-53.
40. Id. at 656.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
42. 448 U.S. at 656.
43. Id. at 698. Justices Marshall, Brennan, White and Blackmun dissented in the judgment
and roundly condemned the plurality's decision as "both extraordinarily arrogant and extraordi-
narily unfair." Id. at 695.
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dertake a "searching and careful judicial inquiry" into the basis of the
Secretary's findings,44 they also recognized that this duty did not mean that
they were to "undertake independent review of adequately supported scientific
findings made by a technically expert agency."45 Emphasizing that, even
under the substantial evidence test, judicial review is "ultimately deferen-
tial,"'46 the dissent singled out three key factors which served to make substan-
tial evidence review particularly difficult under OSHA: the high level of
technological complexity, the impossibility of achieving definite resolution of
factual issues, and the inability of avoiding policy considerations "when the
question involves determination of the acceptable level of risk [to worker
health]." 47 The dissent rejected the notion that these complications justified
the plurality's excessively demanding review, and went so far as to say that
"today's decision represents a usurpation of decisionmaking authority that has
been exercised by and properly belongs with Congress and its authorized
representatives. '48
The rationale of the dissent in-American Petroleum also was evident in the
rulings of several lower courts on the issue of substantial evidence. In United
Steelworkers of America v. Marshall,49 one of the most notable lower court
cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the stringent, OSHA-promulgated lead exposure standard was enforce-
able even though based on "the inconclusive but suggestive results of numer-
ous studies." °50 The scope of judicial review was expressed in very narrow
terms,5 1 and the court seemed to presage Justice Marshall's dissent in Ameri-
can Petroleum when it noted, "[W]e must remember that the precise choice of
[a numerical toxic exposure limit] is essentially a legislative judgment to which
we must accord great deference and which only must fall within a 'zone of
reasonableness.' ",52
The humanitarian concerns that ultimately held sway inAmerican Textile
were also present in the United Steelworkers decision. While the court of ap-
peals faulted OSHA for being careless in some data presentation and analy-
sis,5 3 it refused to second-guess technologically complicated agency decisions
and observed that "OSHA cannot let workers suffer while it awaits the Godot
44. Id. at 695 n.9.
45. Id. at 695. The dissent believed that de novo review was "especially inappropriate" when
complicated scientific data was at issue, as the Court plainly lacked expertise in such matters. The
logical thrust of this deferential approach was that the "reviewing court must be mindful of the
limited nature of its role," even under substantial evidence review. Id. at 706.
46. Id. at 705.
47. Id. at 705-06.
48. Id. at 712.
49. 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
50. Id. at 1253 (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37-38 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)).
51. Review was restricted to "requiring the agency to identify relevant factual evidence, to
explain the logic and the policies underlying any legislative choice, to state candidly any assump-
tions on which it relies, and to present its reasons for rejecting significant contrary evidence and
argument." Id. at 1207.
52. Id. at 1253.
53. The majority proffered the slightly understated criticism that OSHA's carelessness "will
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of scientific certainty. It can and must make reasonable predictions on the
basis of 'credible sources of information. . . ."4 Although the substantial
evidence issue was remanded in regard to some secondary segments of the
steel industry, the standard was upheld in major respects, with the court noting
that "we cannot require of OSHA anything like certainty."55 The United
Steelworkers court characterized the difficulty of substantial evidence review
in clear-cut terms:
The peculiar problem of reviewing the rules of agencies like OSHA
lies in applying the substantial evidence test to regulations which are
essentially legislative and rooted in inferences from complex scien-
tific and factual data, and which often necessarily involve highly
speculative projections of technological development in areas wholly
lacking in scientific and economic certainty.56
Faced with such highly speculative projections, the United Steelworkers court
struck the balance in favor of worker health and excused data inadequacies
when the American Petroleum Court would not.5 7
In rejecting both the conceptually valid industry challenge to the substan-
tial evidence issue and the cost-benefit analysis,5 8 the American Textile Court
moved far toward adopting the reasoning of United Steelworkers and the
American Petroleum dissent. The American Textile Court therefore revealed a
strong measure of deference to administrative rulemaking authority and con-
siderable solicitude for worker health. Whereas fifty volumes of benzene data
were deemed insufficient in American Petroleum, a generous reading of the
faulty RTI and Hocutt-Thomas cotton dust studies met the substantial evi-
dence standard in American Textile.
In evaluating the feasibility of the $656.5 million total compliance figure
under section 655(f),59 the court of appeals inAmerican Textile had recognized
that the task of the court under the substantial evidence requirement was "to
provide a careful check on the agency's determinations." 60 But the court also
believed that it had great flexibility in assessing whether the evidence was sub-
stantial. This flexibility becomes the essence of the judicial review standard in
the Supreme Court opinion, and the concept of "careful check" conveniently
never place the lead exposure standard in the Pantheon of administrative proceedings." Id. at
1207.
54. Id. at 1266 (quoting AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 657-58 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1206-07.
57. The United Steelworkers bench found ample precedent for its holding in an early toxic
exposure case, Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in which OSHA
was found to have broad discretion in the area of toxics regulation. The Hodgson court held that
when data was obtained "on the frontiers of scientific knowledge," regulations "must in that cir-
cumstance depend to a greater extent upon policy judgments and less upon purely factual analy-
sis." Id. at 474.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 2491-92. The Court was aware of the difficulty the industry faced in achiev-
ing compliance and freely admitted that "some marginal employers may shut down rather than
comply." 101 S. Ct. at 2501. Even on those facts, however, the value of worker health was
thought to preclude any mechanical application of cost-benefit analysis.
59. See note 32 supra.
60. 617 F.2d at 649.
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is omitted. The Court fully adopts the "familiar rule" that "[tihis Court will
intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the [substantial
evidence] standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misap-
plied' by the court below."' 61 Although the exposure levels contemplated by
Hocutt-Thomas were less stringent than those ultimately adopted by the Sec-
retary, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's speculation that "little
more than the dust control measures assumed by the industry [Hocutt-
Thomas] would be necessary to achieve the final PEL."'62 In spite of conflict-
ing and inapposite data, the Court nonetheless believed it was warranted in
upholding the precise and demanding cotton dust standard mandated by the
Secretary.63
A requirement of scientifically impeccable data and careful economic bal-
ancing undoubtedly would have been particularly inappropriate in the case of
brown lung disease. Due to increased popular awareness of the dangers of
toxic exposure, the class protected by the cotton dust standard engendered
considerable public sympathy. The facts of American Textile offered the
Court a perfect opportunity to recognize that neither a compendium of abso-
lute scientific truth nor a mathematically precise economic analysis was
mandatory where considerations of high technology response to imperfectly
understood incidence of disease were involved.
Nonetheless, the legal foundation of the Court's decision is open to chal-
lenge. Had it not been for the emotional appeal of the protected class, the
cotton dust standards might well have been invalidated because they were
based on insubstantial evidence. Justice Stewart's dissent clearly echoes the
demanding concept of substantial evidence review articulated in American Pe-
troleum and suggests that the agency badly overstepped its bounds in promul-
gating cotton dust standards based on grossly insufficient evidence. 64 Neither
the RTI nor the Hocutt-Thomas study was geared to the standards ultimately
adopted. In addition, both studies suffered from assorted methodological in-
adequacies. 65 As Justice Stewart correctly noted, even feasibility analysis can-
not be made without substantial evidence. His dissent attacked the majority
decision for this very reason:
The agency flatly rejected [the RTI] prediction as a gross over-esti-
mate. . . . [Then] [t]he agency examined the Hocutt-Thomas study,
and concluded that it too was an over-estimate of the costs of the less
stringent standard it was addressing... . But in a remarkable non se-
quitur, the agency decided that because the Hocutt-Thomas study
was an over-estimate of the cost of a less stringent standard, it could
be treated as a reliable estimate for the more costly final Standard
61. 101 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,491 (1951)).
62. 617 F.2d at 660.
63. The Court did refuse, however, to "scrutinize the record to uncover and formulate a
rationale" for the transfer with pay provision. 101 S. Ct. at 2505 n.73. That issue was remanded
for further examination in the court below and thus represented the industry's sole success in its
challenge to the standards.
64. Id. at 2506-07.
65. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
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actually promulgated, never rationally explaining how it came to this
happy conclusion. This is not substantial evidence. It is unsup-
ported speculation.66
In light of the Court's demanding substantial evidence review in American
Petroleum, Justice Stewart's dissent seems well taken. The rigorous cast of
mind that prevailed on the American Petroleum bench perhaps was tempered
by the more obvious peril to the cotton worker considered inAmerican Textile.
While the carcinogenic qualities of benzene at low levels were open to dispute,
the fact that byssinosis "affected as many as 30% of the workers [in some pro-
duction processes] in some American cotton mills" was fairly clear.67 The
public appeal of the cause in American Textile allowed the Court to direct its
focus away from the substantial evidence requirement of section 655(f) and
instead to speak of the "best available evidence" required by section
655(b)(5). 68 In effect, the American Textile decision may be read as at least a
partial fulfillment of Justice Marshall's predictions in the American Petroleum
dissent:
In all likelihood, [4merican Petroleum] will come to be regarded as
an extreme reaction to a regulatory scheme that, as the Members of
the plurality perceived it, imposed an unduly harsh burden on regu-
lated industries. . . . I am confident that the approach taken by the
plurality today. . . will eventually be abandoned, and that the rep-
resentative branches of government will once again be allowed to
determine the level of safety and health protection to be accorded to
the American worker.69
In minimizing the rigorous demands of the substantial evidence standard
of review, the Supreme Court plainly followed the spirit of the court of ap-
peals' holding inAmerican Textile.70 The lower court had predicated its hold-
ing on the fact that Congress "delegated unusually broad discretionary
authority" to OSHA for the issuance of regulations. 71 The court evidenced an
extremely deferential attitude toward agency determinations when it noted
that "[tlo protect workers from material health impairments, OSHA must rely
on predictions of possible future events and extrapolations from limited data.
It may have to fill gaps in knowledge with policy considerations." 72 Likewise,
the Supreme Court voiced a similar flexibility, rather than the exacting tone of
the earlierAmerican Petroleum decision, when it noted and readily excused the
fact that "both the RTI and Hocutt-Thomas studies had to rely on assump-
tions the truth or falsity of which could wreak havoc on the validity of their
66. 101 S. Ct. at 2507.
67. 448 U.S. at 646. See also note 15 supra.
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(5), 655(f) (1976).
69. 448 U.S. at 723-24.
70. 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
71. Id. at 649.
72. Id. at 651. The court went on to note that "standards do not become infeasible simply
because they may impose substantial costs on an industry, force the development of new technol-
ogy, or even force some employers out of business. Otherwise the Act's commitment to protect
workers might be forever frustrated." Id. at 655.
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final numerical cost estimates."'73
The key issue in future litigation may well be just how much "havoc" the
Court will allow before invalidating standards under the section 655(1) stan-
dard of review. The wide divergence of approaches to judicial review evi-
denced by American Textile and American Petroleum does not lend itself to a
natural synthesis, but some directions of the Court are discernible. First, in-
dustrial noncooperation will not be tolerated lightly. Because the Secretary
had been limited in the precision of his estimates "by the industry's refusal to
make more of its own data available," 74 the industry was not readily heard to
complain once final standards were enacted.
Second, by strictly limiting its review function and simply "declin[ing] to
hold as a matter of law"75 that OSHA's determination was unsupported by
substantial evidence, the Court may have given a first hint of abdicating the
field of rigorous review so willingly entered in American Petroleum. As Milton
Wright of RTI noted, "We establish bounds on the costs. We're encouraged to
do so by the agencies."'76 "Hard evidence is almost non-existent" 77 for certain
textile production stages, and the absence of data on other aspects of cotton
dust exposure has been termed "particularly regrettable" 78 and "especially un-
fortunate."'79 Bounds and nonexistent data are hardly the stuff of which truly
meaningful substantial evidence review can be made. Mr. Wright termed the
Secretary's conclusions "fairly logical."80 Perhaps after American Textile sub-
stantial evidence will come to be regarded as "fair logic" in protective veneer.
Third, even though the Court commited itself to a liberal interpretation of
substantial evidence in American Textile, a major question remains as to ex-
actly how far the Court will go in employing the substantial evidence review as
a validation device for extremely costly industrial regulation. Substantial evi-
dence may well demonstrate increased risk to worker health as industrial
processes grow in sophistication and in toxic exposure levels, but a delicate
balance ultimately must be struck between protective regulation and the sur-
vival of the industry under review. The American Textile Court explicitly re-
fused to decide "the question whether a Standard that threatens the long-term
profitability and competitiveness of an industry is 'feasible' within the mean-
ing of. . .29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)."81I When faced with the possibility of indus-
73. 101 S. Ct. at 2500 n.54.
74. Id. at 2500. Hocutt referred to the confidentiality of his sources during committee hear-
ings. Id. at 2500 n.51. On the other hand, Milton Wright of RTI, who supervised the engineering
control estimates, remembered that the industry was "willing to be cooperative" and "didn't hesi-
tate" to supply data when requested. However, Mr. Wright did not note that complete industry-
wide data were not available and that the lack of a central source complicated estimate proce-
dures. Interview with Milton Wright, Consultant, RTI, in Research Triangle Park, N.C. (Nov. 18,
1981).
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2500.
76. Interview, supra note 74 (emphasis added).
77. Id. (referring to weaving).
78. RTI, supra note 17, at vol. 1, 11-3.
79. Id. at 111-6.
80. Interview, supra note 74.
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2501 n.55.
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trial demise and resulting economic dislocation, the Court may feel itself
constrained to preserve worker employment at the expense of worker health.
This problem may become particularly acute in times of mounting concern
over the debilitating effects of unemployment upon the nation as a whole.
Some degree of judicial experimentation in this regard is to be expected in
future litigation, with the Act's provision for industrial petition for variance in
compliance serving as a buffer against the economic shock of restrictive
regulation.82
It is to be hoped that such future judicial experimentation in review of
agency action will preserve the element of concern for human well-being so
eloquently expressed inAmerican Textile. At bottom, it is precisely this sort of
policy determination that lies at the core of the American Textile decision. An
attempt to incorporate absolute quantification into such policy-making plainly
would have elevated industry profit above worker health. In this respect, the
Court's deferential treatment of the substantial evidence standard of review in
American Textile is to be welcomed as a necessary and sensible response to a
pressing human need.
GEORGIA L. HERRING
82. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (1976) makes specific provision for variance from standards promul-
gated by OSHA, allowing "[a]ny affected employer [to] apply to the Secretary for a rule or order
r a variance."
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